Forty years ago, Wiesner pointed out that quantum mechanics raises the striking possibility of money that cannot be counterfeited according to the laws of physics. We propose the first quantum money scheme that is
INTRODUCTION
"Information wants to be free"-this slogan expresses the idea that classical bits, unlike traditional economic goods, can be copied an unlimited number of times. The copyability of classical information is one of the foundations of the digital economy, but it is also a nuisance to governments, publishers, software companies, and others who wish to prevent copying. Today, essentially all electronic commerce involves a trusted third party, such as a credit card company, to mediate transactions. Without such a third party entering at some stage, it is impossible to prevent electronic cash from being counterfeited, regardless of what cryptographic assumptions one makes. 1 Famously, though, quantum bits do not "want to be free" in the same sense that classical bits do: in many respects, they behave more like gold, oil, or other traditional economic goods. Indeed, the No-Cloning Theorem, which is an immediate consequence of the linearity of quantum mechanics, says that there is no physical procedure that takes as input an unknown 2 quantum pure state |ψ , and that produces as output two unentangled copies of |ψ , or even a close approximation thereof. The No-Cloning Theorem is closely related to the uncertainty principle, which says that there exist "complementary" properties of a quantum state (for example, its position and momentum) that cannot both be measured to unlimited accuracy.
In followup work in 1982, Bennett, Brassard, Breidbart, and Wiesner [14] (henceforth BBBW) at least showed how to eliminate the giant database problem: namely, by generating the state |ψs = ψ f k (s) using a pseudorandom function f k , with key k known only by the bank. Unlike Wiesner's original scheme, the BBBW scheme is no longer informationtheoretically secure: a counterfeiter can recover k given exponential computation time. On the other hand, a counterfeiter cannot break the scheme in polynomial time, unless it can also distinguish f k from a random function.
These early ideas about quantum money inspired the field of quantum cryptography [13] . But strangely, the subject of quantum money itself lay dormant for more than two decades, even as interest in quantum computing exploded. However, the past few years have witnessed a "quantum money renaissance." Some recent work has offered partial solutions to the verifiability problem: for example, Mosca and Stebila [32] suggested that the bank use a blind quantum computing protocol to offload the verification of banknotes to local merchants, while Gavinsky [23] proposed a variant of Wiesner's scheme that requires only classical communication between the merchant and bank. position) on some copies, and a complementary observable (such as momentum) on other copies. Conversely, if we could measure all the properties of |ψ to unlimited accuracy, then we could use the measurement results to create additional copies of |ψ .
However, most of the focus today is on a more ambitious goal: namely, creating what Aaronson [3] called public-key quantum money, or quantum money that anyone could authenticate, not just the bank that printed it. As with publickey cryptography in the 1970s, it is far from obvious a priori whether public-key quantum money is possible at all. Can a bank publish a description of a quantum circuit that lets people feasibly recognize a state |ψ , but does not let them feasibly prepare or even copy |ψ ?
Aaronson [3] gave the first formal treatment of public-key quantum money, as well as related notions such as copyprotected quantum software. He proved that there exists a quantum oracle relative to which secure public-key quantum money is possible. Unfortunately, that result, though already involved, did not lead in any obvious way to an explicit (or "real-world") quantum money scheme. 4 He raised as an open problem whether secure public-key quantum money is possible relative to a classical oracle. In the same paper, Aaronson also proposed an explicit scheme, based on random stabilizer states, but could not offer any evidence for its security. And indeed, the scheme was broken about a year afterward by Lutomirski et al. [30] , using an algorithm for finding planted cliques in random graphs due to Alon, Krivelevich, and Sudakov [7] .
Recently, Farhi et al. [22] took a completely different approach to public-key quantum money. They proposed a quantum money scheme based on knot theory, where each banknote is a superposition over exponentially-many oriented link diagrams. Within a given banknote, all the link diagrams L have the same Alexander polynomial p (L) (a certain knot invariant). 5 This p (L), together with a digital signature of p (L), serves as the banknote's "classical serial number." Besides the unusual mathematics employed, the work of Farhi et al. [22] (building on [30] ) also developed an idea that will play a major role in our work. That idea is to construct public-key quantum money schemes by composing two "simpler" ingredients: first, objects that we call minischemes; and second, classical digital signature schemes.
The main disadvantage of the knot-based scheme, which it shares with every previous scheme, is that no one can say much about its security-other than that it has not yet been broken, and that various known counterfeiting strategies fail. Indeed, even characterizing which quantum states Farhi et al.' s verification procedure accepts remains a difficult open problem, on which progress seems likely to require major advances in knot theory! In other words, there might be states that look completely different from "legitimate banknotes," but are still accepted with high probability.
In followup work, Lutomirski [29] proposed an "abstract" version of the knot scheme, which gets rid of the link diagrams and Alexander polynomials, and simply uses a classical oracle to achieve the same purposes. Lutomirski raised the challenge of proving that this oracle scheme is securein which case, it would have yielded the first public-key quantum money scheme that was proven secure relative to a classical oracle. Unfortunately, proving the security of Lutomirski's scheme remains open, and seems hard. 6 As alluded to earlier, there is already some research on ways to break quantum money schemes. Besides the papers by Lutomirski [28] and Lutomirski et al. [30] mentioned before, let us mention the beautiful work of Farhi et al. on quantum state restoration [21] . As we discuss in Section 7, quantum state restoration can be used to break many public-key quantum money schemes: roughly speaking, any scheme where the banknotes contain only limited entanglement, and where verification consists of a rank-1 projective measurement. This fact explains why our scheme, like the knot-based scheme of Farhi et al. [22] , will require highlyentangled banknotes.
The Challenge
Work over the past few years has revealed a surprising richness in the quantum money problem-both in the ideas that have been used to construct public-key quantum money schemes, and in the ideas that have been used to break them. Of course, this record also underscores the need for caution! To whatever extent we can, we ought to hold quantum money schemes to modern cryptographic standards, and not be satisfied with "we tried to break it and failed."
It is easy to see that, if public-key quantum money is possible, then it must rely on some computational assumption, in addition to the No-Cloning Theorem. 7 The best case would be to show that secure, public-key quantum money is possible, if (for example) there exist one-way functions resistant to quantum attack. Unfortunately, we seem a long way from showing anything of the kind. The basic problem is that uncloneability is a novel cryptographic requirement: something that would not even make sense in a classical context. Indeed, work by Farhi et al. [21] and Aaronson [3] has shown that it is sometimes possible to copy quantum banknotes, via attacks that do not even measure the banknotes in an attempt to learn a classical secret! Rather, these attacks simply perform some unitary transformation on a legitimate banknote |$ together with an ancilla |0 , the end result of which is to produce |$ ⊗2 . Given such a strange attack, how can one deduce the failure of any "standard" cryptographic assumption?
Yet despite the novelty of the quantum money problemor perhaps because of it-it seems reasonable to want some non-tautological evidence that a public-key quantum money scheme is secure. A minimal wish-list might include:
(1) Security under some plausible assumption, of a sort cryptographers know how to evaluate. Such an assumption should talk only about computing a classical 6 One way to understand the difficulty is that any security proof for Lutomirski's scheme would need to contain Aaronson's quantum lower bound for the collision problem [1] as a (tiny) special case. The lower bound for the collision problem is proved using the polynomial method of Beals et al. [11] . In this work, by contrast, we will only manage to prove the security of our oracle scheme using a specially-designed variant of Ambainis's quantum adversary method [8] . Despite great progress in quantum lower bounds over the past decade, it is still not known (except implicitly) how to prove the collision lower bound using an adversary argument. 7 This is because a counterfeiter with unlimited time could simply search for a state |ψ that the (publicly-known) verification procedure accepted.
output from a classical input; it should have nothing to do with cloning of quantum states.
(2) A proof that the money scheme is secure against blackbox counterfeiters: those that do not exploit the structure of some cryptographic function f used in verifying the banknotes.
(3) A "simple" verification process, which accepts all valid banknotes |$ with probability 1, and rejects all banknotes that are far from |$ .
Our Results
Our main contribution is a new public-key quantum money scheme, which achieves all three items in the wish-list above, and which is the first to achieve (1) or (2) . Regardless of whether our particular scheme stands or falls, we introduce at least four techniques that should be useful for the design and analysis of any public-key quantum money scheme. These are:
• The "inner-product adversary method," a new variant of Ambainis's quantum adversary method [8] that can be used to rule out black-box counterfeiting strategies.
• A notion of mini-schemes, and a proof that (together with standard cryptographic assumptions) these objects imply full-fledged quantum money schemes.
• A method to amplify weak counterfeiters into strong ones, so that one only needs to rule out the latter to show security.
• A new connection between the security of quantum money schemes and direct-product assumptions in cryptography.
A second contribution is to construct the first privatekey quantum money schemes that remain unconditionally secure, even if the counterfeiter can interact adaptively with the bank. This gives the first solution to the "online attack problem," a major security hole in the Wiesner [39] and BBBW [14] schemes pointed out by Lutomirski [28] and Aaronson [3] . These private-key schemes are direct adaptations of our public-key scheme.
In more detail, our quantum money scheme is based on hidden subspaces of the vector space F n 2 . Each of our money states is a uniform superposition of the vectors in a random n/2-dimensional subspace A ≤ F n 2 . We denote this superposition by |A . Crucially, we can recognize the state |A using only membership oracles for A and for its dual subspace A ⊥ . To do so, we apply the membership oracle for A, then a Fourier transform, then the membership oracle for A ⊥ , and then a second Fourier transform to restore the original state. We prove that this operation computes a rank-1 projection onto |A .
Underlying the security of our money schemes is the assertion that the states |A are difficult to clone, even given membership oracles for A and A ⊥ . Or more concretely: any quantum algorithm that maps |A to |A ⊗2 must make 2 Ω(n) queries to the A, A ⊥ oracles. In order to prove this statement, we introduce a new method for proving lower bounds on quantum query complexity, which we call the inner-product adversary method. This technique considers a single counterfeiting algorithm being run in parallel to clone two distinct states |A and |A , with each having access to the membership oracles for A, A ⊥ or A , A ⊥ , as appropriate. To measure how much progress the algorithm has made, we consider the inner product between the states produced by the parallel executions: because A| ⊗2 |A ⊗2 < A|A for many pairs of subspaces A, A , in order to succeed a counterfeiter will have to reduce this inner product substantially. We prove that when averaged over a suitable distribution of pairs A, A , the expected inner product between the two states produced by the counterfeiter cannot decrease too much with a single query to the membership oracles. We conclude that in order to produce |A ⊗2 given |A and membership oracles for A, A ⊥ , a counterfeiter must use exponentially many queries.
Having ruled out the possibility of nearly perfect cloning, we introduce a new amplification protocol, which allows us to transform a counterfeiter who succeeds with Ω (1/ poly (n)) success probability into a counterfeiter who succeeds with probability arbitrarily close to 1. This technique is based on combining standard Grover search with a monotonic state amplification protocol of Tulsi, Grover, and Patel [38] , to obtain monotonic convergence with the quadratic speedup of Grover search.
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Combining this amplification with the inner-product adversary method, and applying a random linear transformation to convert the counterfeiter's worst case to its average case, we conclude that no counterfeiting algorithm can succeed with any non-negligible probability on a non-negligible fraction of states |A .
Using these results, how do we produce a secure quantum money scheme? We now need to step back, and discuss some general constructions of this paper that have nothing to do with hidden subspaces in particular. Before constructing a quantum money scheme, we first introduce the notion of a quantum money mini-scheme, a formalization of the setting in which the bank issues only a single money state and maintains no secret information. Formally, a mini-scheme is a protocol Bank for outputting pairs (s, ρs) and a verification procedure Vers for identifying ρs. We say a mini-scheme is complete if the state ρs passes the verification Vers with high probability, and we say the scheme is secure if furthermore no counterfeiter can take a single state ρs, and produce two (possibly-entangled) states ρ1 and ρ2 which simultaneously pass the verification procedure with non-negligible probability.
In the case of hidden subspace money, for example, we can use our uncloneability result to produce a secure minischeme relative to a classical oracle. The algorithm Bank queries the classical oracle to obtain a serial number s and the description of a subspace A. Using this description it prepares |A , and publishes (s, |A ). The verification procedure uses the serial number s as an index into another classical oracle, which allows it to test membership in A and A ⊥ . We prove that the uncloneability of the states |A implies that this mini-scheme is secure.
Crucially, we also give a general reduction from quantum money schemes to mini-schemes, based on combining a minischeme with a secure signature scheme. The bank maintains a secret key for the signature scheme, and to issue a banknote, it runs Bank to produce a pair (s, ρs), then digitally signs the serial number s. Special cases of this reduction appeared in [22, 30] , but we provide the first rigorous security proof.
By combining this reduction with our mini-scheme, we are able to obtain a "black-box" public key quantum money scheme relative to a classical oracle, which is unconditionally secure: By adapting these ideas to the private-key setting, we are also able to provide the first private-key quantum money scheme that is unconditionally secure, even if the counterfeiter is able to interact adaptively with the bank. This patches a security hole in Wiesner's original scheme which was observed in [28, 3] , but which has not previously been addressed in a provably-secure way.
Finally, we provide a candidate cryptographic protocol for obfuscating the indicator functions of subspaces A ≤ F n 2 . In order to obfuscate a membership oracle for A, we provide a random system of polynomials p1, . . . , pm that vanish on A.
Membership in A can be tested by evaluating the pi's, but given only the pi's, we conjecture that it is difficult to recover A. Combining this protocol with the black-box money scheme, we obtain an explicit quantum money scheme. This scheme is also the first public-key quantum money scheme whose security can be based on a plausible "classical" cryptographic assumption. Here is the assumption: Note that we can trivially guess a single nonzero A element with success probability 2 −n/2 , but guessing a whole basis for A would succeed with probability only 2
Conjecture (*) asserts that it is harder to find many elements of A than to find just one element.
The following theorem says that, if a counterfeiter could break our quantum money scheme, then with nontrivial success probability, it could also recover a description of A from the pi's and qi's alone-even without having access to a bank that provides a valid money state |A .
Theorem.
Assuming Conjecture (*), there exists a publickey quantum money scheme with perfect completeness and exponentially-small soundness error. That is, the verifier always accepts valid banknotes, and a would-be counterfeiter succeeds only with exponentially-small probability. 9 The problem of recovering a subspace A, given a system of equations that vanish on A, is closely related to algebraic cryptanalysis, and in particular to the so-called polynomial isomorphism problem. In the latter problem, we are given as input two polynomials p, q : F n → F related by an unknown linear change of basis L; the challenge is to find L. When deg (p) = deg (q) = 3, the best known algorithms for the polynomial isomorphism problem require exponential time [35, 24, 17 ]. An attacker might be able to use known techniques to effectively reduce the degree of the polynomials in our scheme by 1, at the expense of an exponentially reduced success probability [17] . Provided the degree is at least 4, however, recovering A seems to be well beyond existing techniques.
Motivation
Unlike the closely-related task of quantum key distribution [13] (which is already practical), quantum money currently seems to be a long way off. The basic difficulty is how to maintain the coherence of a quantum money state for an appreciable length of time. All money eventually loses its value unless it is spent, but money that decohered on a scale of microseconds would be an extreme example! So one might wonder: why develop rigorous foundations for a cryptographic functionality that seems so far from being practical? One answer is that, just as quantum key distribution uses many of the same ideas as private-key quantum money, but without requiring long-lasting coherence, so it is not hard to imagine protocols that would use many of the same ideas as public-key quantum money without requiring long-lasting coherence. Indeed, depending on the problem, rapid decoherence might be a feature rather than a bug! As one example, public-key quantum money that decohered quickly could be used to create non-interactive uncloneable signatures. These are n-qubit quantum states |ψ that an agent can efficiently prepare using a private key, then freely hand out to passersby. By feeding |ψ , together with the agent's public key, into suitable measuring equipment, anyone can verify on the spot that the agent is who she says she is and not an impostor. Compared with classical identification protocols, the novel feature here is that the agent does not need to respond to a challenge-for example, digitally signing a random string-but can instead just hand out a fixed |ψ non-interactively. Furthermore, because |ψ decoheres in a matter of seconds, and recovering a classical description of |ψ from measurements on it is computationally intractable, someone who is given |ψ cannot use it later to impersonate the agent.
Of course, if an attacker managed to solve the technological problem of keeping |ψ coherent for very long times, then he could break this system, by collecting one or more copies of |ψ that an agent had handed out, and using them to impersonate the agent. But in that case, whatever method the attacker was using to keep the states coherent could also-once discovered-be used to create a secure publickey quantum money scheme! However, we believe the "real" reason to study quantum money is basically the same as the "real" reason to study quantum computing as a whole-or for that matter, to study the many interesting aspects of classical cryptography that are equally far from application. As theoretical computer scientists, we are in the business of mapping out the inherent capabilities and limits of information processing.
In our case, what quantum money provides is a near-ideal playground for understanding the implications of the uncertainty principle and the No-Cloning Theorem. In the early days of quantum mechanics, Bohr [15] and others argued that the uncertainty principle requires us to change our conception of science itself-their basic argument being that, in physics, predictions are only ever as good as our knowledge of a system's initial state |ψ , but the uncertainty principle might mean that the initial state is unknowable even with arbitrarily-precise measurements.
But does this argument have any "teeth"? In other words: among the properties of a quantum state |ψ that make the state impossible to learn precisely or to duplicate, can any of those properties ever matter empirically? To us, quantum money is interesting precisely because it gives one of the clearest examples where the answer to that question is yes.
PRELIMINARIES
To begin, we fix some notation. Let [N ] = {1, . . . , N}. Given a subspace S of a vector space V , let S ⊥ be the orthogonal complement of S (that is, the set of y ∈ V such that x · y = 0 for all x ∈ S). We call a function δ (n) negligible if δ (n) = o (1/p (n)) for every polynomial p.
By a classical oracle, we will mean a unitary transformation of the form |x → (−1)
f (x) |x , for some Boolean function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1}. Note that, unless specified otherwise, even a classical oracle can be queried in quantum superposition. A quantum oracle, by contrast, is an arbitrary n-qubit unitary transformation U (or rather, a collection of such U 's, one for each n) that a quantum algorithm can apply in a black-box fashion. Quantum oracles were defined and studied by Aaronson and Kuperberg [5] .
Cryptography
Before we construct quantum money schemes, it will be helpful to have some "conventional" cryptographic primitives in our toolbox. Foremost among these is a digital signature scheme secure against quantum chosen-message attacks. We now define digital signature schemes-both for completeness, and to fix the quantum attack model that is relevant for us. • KeyGen, which takes as input a security parameter 0 n , and generates a key pair (kprivate, k public ).
• Sign, which takes as input kprivate and a message x, and generates a signature Sign (kprivate, x). 10 10 We indulge in slight abuse of notation, since if Sign is ran- Intuitively, we call a signature scheme "secure" if no quantum counterfeiter with nonadaptive, classical access to a signing oracle O can forge a signature for any message that it did not submit to O. Depending on the application, one might want to change Definition 1 in various ways: for example, by giving the counterfeiter adaptive or quantum access to O, or by letting KeyGen, Sign, and Ver be quantum algorithms themselves. For this paper, however, Definition 1 provides all we need. Do signature schemes secure against quantum attack exist? Naturally, signature schemes based on RSA or other number-theoretic problems can all be broken by a quantum computer. However, building on earlier work by Naor and Yung [33] (among many others), Rompel [37] showed that a secure public-key signature scheme can be constructed from any one-way function-not necessarily a trapdoor function. Furthermore, Rompel's security reduction, from breaking the signature scheme to inverting the one-way function, is black-box : in particular, nothing in it depends on the assumption that the adversary is classical rather than quantum. We therefore get the following consequence:
Theorem 2 (Quantum-Secure Signature Schemes [37] Recently, Boneh et al. [16] proved several results similar to Theorem 2, and they needed nontrivial work to do so. However, a crucial difference is that Boneh et al. were (justifiably) concerned with quantum adversaries who can make quantum queries to the signing oracle O. By contrast, as mentioned earlier, for our application it suffices to consider adversaries who query O classically-and in that case, the domized then the signature need not be a function of kprivate and x. standard security reductions go through essentially without change.
Let us state another consequence of Theorem 2, which will be useful for our oracle construction in Section 5. n → {0, 1} p(n) secure against quantum adversaries. Now, the security reduction of Rompel [37] is not only blackbox but relativizing: that is, it goes through if all legitimate and malicious parties have access to the same oracle A. So by Theorem 2, starting from {fn} one can construct a digital signature scheme relative to the same oracle A, which is secure against quantum chosen-message attacks. Further details are given in the full version.
Theorem 3 (Relativized Quantum-Secure Signatures

Quantum Information
Let us collect a few facts about quantum pure and mixed states that are used in the paper. We assume basic familiarity with the formalism of bras, kets, density matrices, etc.; see Nielsen and Chuang [34] for a good overview.
Given two mixed states ρ and σ, their trace distance is defined as
|λi|, where λ1, . . . , λN are the eigenvalues of ρ − σ. Trace distance is a metric and satisfies 0 ≤ D (ρ, σ) ≤ 1. Also, the fidelity 0 ≤ F (ρ, σ) ≤ 1 is defined, in this paper, as the maximum of | ψ|ϕ | over all purifications |ψ of ρ and |ϕ of σ.
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By extension, given a subspace S, we let F (ρ, S) be the maximum of | ψ|ϕ | over all purifications |ψ of ρ and all unit vectors |ϕ ∈ S. While fidelity is not a metric, it does satisfy the following inequality, which will be helpful in Section 5.
Lemma 4 ("Triangle Inequality" for Fidelity). Suppose
Proof. Deferred to the full version. Finally, the following lemma of Aaronson [2] will imply that, as long as a quantum money scheme has small completeness error (i.e., small probability of rejecting a valid banknote), the banknotes can be reused many times. Lemma 5 ("Almost As Good As New Lemma" [2] ). Suppose a measurement on a mixed state ρ yields a particular outcome with probability 1−ε. Then after the measurement, one can recover a state ρ such that ρ − ρ tr ≤ √ ε.
Quantum Search
In our security proof for quantum money, a crucial step will be to amplify a counterfeiter who copies a banknote $ with any non-negligible fidelity to a counterfeiter who copies $ almost perfectly. Taking the contrapositive, this will imply that to rule out the former sort of counterfeiter, it suffices to rule out the latter.
In this section, we first review two variants of Grover's search algorithm [25] that are useful for amplifying the fidelity of quantum states. We then introduce a new variant that combines the advantages of both. 11 Some authors instead define "fidelity" as the maximum of
Throughout, assume we are given a pure initial state |Init , in some Hilbert space H. Our goal is to map |Init to a final state |Ψ that lies in (or close to) a "good subspace" G ≤ H. We have oracle access to two unitary transformations:
• UInit, which maps |Init to − |Init , and acts as the identity on all |v orthogonal to |Init .
• UG, which maps |v to − |v for all |v ∈ G, and acts as the identity on all |v orthogonal to G.
We are promised that F (|Init , G) = max |ψ ∈G Init |ψ , the fidelity of the initial state with G, is at least some ε > 0. In this scenario, provided F (|Init , G) is known, the amplitude amplification framework of Brassard, Høyer, Mosca, and Tapp [18] lets us prepare a state close to G using Θ (1/ε) iterations:
Lemma 6 (Amplitude Amplification [18] 
Note that Grover's algorithm is simply a special case of Lemma 6, where |Init is the uniform superposition over N basis states |1 , . . . , |N , and G is the subspace spanned by "marked" states.
However, Lemma 6 has an annoying drawback, which it shares with ordinary Grover search. Namely, the algorithm does not converge monotonically toward the target subspace G, but could instead "wildly overshoot it," cycling around the 2-dimensional subspace spanned by |Bad and |Good . If we know the fidelity F (|Init , G) in advance (rather than just a lower bound on the fidelity), or if we can prepare new copies of |Init "free of charge" in case of failure, then this overshooting is not a serious problem. Alas, neither of those conditions will hold in our application.
Fortunately, for independent reasons, in 2005 Tulsi, Grover, and Patel [38] introduced a new quantum search algorithm that does guarantee monotonic convergence toward G, by alternating unitary transformations with measurements. (Their algorithm was later simplified and improved by Chakraborty, Radhakrishnan, and Raghunathan [19] .) Lemma 7 (Fixed-Point Quantum Search [38, 19] ). By using T oracle calls to UInit and UG, we can prepare a state |Ψ such that
Rearranging, Lemma 7 lets us prepare a state |Ψ such that
On the positive side, the dependence on 1/δ in this bound is logarithmic: we get not only monotonic convergence toward G, but exponentially-fast convergence. On the negative side, notice that the dependence on ε has worsened from 1/ε to 1/ε 2 -negating the quadratic speedup that was the original point of quantum search! Thus, in the full version, we give a "hybrid" quantum search algorithm that combines the advantages of Lemmas 6 and 7-i.e., it converges monotonically toward the target subspace G (rather than "overshooting" G), but also achieves a quadratic speedup. In the context of our security proof for quantum money, the hybrid algorithm leads to a quadratically-better lower bound on the number of queries that a counterfeiter needs to make, compared to what we would get from using Lemma 7 by itself. While this quadratic improvement is perhaps only of moderate interest, we hope it might find other applications. 
Proof. Deferred to the full version. Note that Theorem 8 loses the exponentially-fast convergence toward the target subspace G, but that property will not be important for us anyway.
We leave as an open problem whether there exists a hybrid algorithm with exponentially-fast convergence.
FORMALIZING QUANTUM MONEY
In this section, we first give a formal cryptographic definition of public-key quantum money schemes. Our definition is similar to that of Aaronson [3] . However, departing from [3] , we next define the new notion of a quantum money minischeme, which is easier to construct and analyze than a fullblown quantum money scheme. A mini-scheme is basically a quantum money scheme where only one banknote ever needs to printed, not many banknotes; and where the procedure for verifying that banknote is treated as given (rather than something that itself needs to be authenticated using the bank's public key). We then prove two basic results: the amplification of weak counterfeiters into strong ones (Theorem 13), and the construction of full-blown quantum money schemes from mini-schemes together with quantumly-secure digital signature schemes (Theorem 14).
Quantum Money Schemes
Intuitively, a public-key quantum money scheme is a scheme by which (1) a trusted "bank" can feasibly generate an unlimited number of quantum banknotes, (2) anyone can feasibly verify a valid banknote as having come from the bank, but (3) no one besides the bank can feasibly map q = poly (n) banknotes to r > q banknotes with any non-negligible success probability.
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We now make the notion more formal.
Definition 9 (Quantum Money Schemes). A public-key quantum money scheme S consists of three polynomialtime quantum algorithms:
• KeyGen, which takes as input a security parameter 0 n , and probabilistically generates a key pair (kprivate, k public ).
• Bank, which takes as input kprivate, and probabilistically generates a quantum state $ called a banknote.
(Usually $ will be an ordered pair (s, ρs), consisting of a classical serial number s and a quantum money state ρs, but this is not strictly necessary.) 12 Previously, Aaronson [3] required only that no polynomialtime counterfeiter could increase its expected number of valid banknotes. However, the stronger condition required here is both achievable, and seemingly more natural from the standpoint of security proofs.
• Ver, which takes as input k public and an alleged banknote / c, and either accepts or rejects.
We say S has completeness error ε if Ver (k public , $) accepts with probability at least 1 − ε for all public keys k public and valid banknotes $. If ε = 0 then S has perfect completeness.
Let 
Here the probability is over the key pair (kprivate, k public ), valid banknotes $1, . . . , $q generated by Bank (kprivate), and the behavior of Count and C. We call S secure if it has completeness error ≤ 1/3 and negligible soundness error.
In the full version, we show that the completeness error in any quantum money scheme can be amplified to 1/2 poly(n) , at the cost of only a small increase in the soundness error. Note that, by Lemma 5 (the "Almost As Good As New Lemma"), once we make the completeness error exponentially small, we can also give our scheme the property that any banknote $ can be verified exponentially many times, before $ gets "worn out" by repeated measurements. This observation is part of what justifies our use of the term "money."
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In this paper, we will often consider relativized quantum money schemes, which simply means that the three procedures KeyGen, Bank, Ver-as well as the counterfeiter C-all get access to exactly the same oracle A : {0, 1} * → {0, 1}. We will also consider relativized digital signature schemes, etc., which are defined analogously.
A private-key quantum money scheme is the same as a public-key scheme, except that the counterfeiter C no longer gets access to k public . (Thus, we might as well set k := k public = kprivate, since the public and private keys no longer play separate roles.) We call a private-key scheme query-secure-a notion "intermediate" between private-key and public-key-if the counterfeiter C is allowed to interact repeatedly with the bank. Given any alleged banknote σ, the bank runs the verification procedure Ver (k, σ), then returns to C both the classical result (i.e., accept or reject) and the post-measurement quantum state σ.
Mini-Schemes
While Definition 9 captures our intuitive requirements for a public-key quantum money scheme, experience has shown that it is cumbersome to work with in practice.
So in this section, we introduce a simpler primitive called minischemes, which require only one uncopyable banknote. We also prove an amplification theorem for a large class of minischemes. Then, in Section 3.3, we will show how minischemes can be generically combined with conventional dig-ital signature schemes to create full public-key quantum money schemes.
Definition 10 (Mini-Schemes). A (public-key) mini-scheme M consists of two polynomial-time quantum algorithms:
• Bank, which takes as input a security parameter 0 n , and probabilistically generates a banknote $ = (s, ρs), where s is a classical serial number, and ρs is a quantum money state.
• Ver, which takes as input an alleged banknote / c, and either accepts or rejects.
We say M has completeness error ε if Ver ($) accepts with probability at least 1−ε for all valid banknotes $. We observe a simple relationship between Definitions 9 and 10: Proposition 11. If there exists a secure public-key money scheme S = (KeyGen S , BankS , VerS), then there also exists a secure mini-scheme M = (BankM, VerM).
Proof. Each banknote output by BankM (0 n ) will have the form (k public , BankS (kprivate)), where (kprivate, k public ) is a key pair output by KeyGen S (0 n ). Then VerM (s, ρs) will accept if and only if VerS (s, ρs) does. Any counterfeiter CM against M can be converted directly into a counterfeiter CS against S.
Call a mini-scheme M = (Bank, Ver) secret-based if Bank works by first generating a uniformly-random classical string r, and then generating a banknote $r := (sr, ρr). Intuitively, in a secret-based scheme, the bank can generate many identical banknotes by simply reusing r, while in a non-secret-based scheme, not even the bank might be able to generate two identical banknotes. Here is an interesting observation:
Proposition 12. If there exists a secure, secret-based minischeme, then there also exists a one-way function secure against quantum attack.
Proof. The desired OWF is SerialNum (r) := sr. If there existed a polynomial-time quantum algorithm to recover r given sr, then we could use that algorithm to produce an unlimited number of additional banknotes $r.
All of the mini-schemes developed in this paper will be secret-based. By contrast, the earlier schemes of Lutomirski et al. [30] and Farhi et al. [22] are non-secret-based, since the serial number s is only obtained as the outcome of a quantum measurement.
The following result is one of the most useful in the paper. Intuitively, it says that in projective mini-schemes, a counterfeiter that copies a banknote with any non-negligible fidelity can be "amplified" to a counterfeiter that copies the banknote almost perfectly-or conversely, that to rule out the former sort of counterfeiter, it suffices to rule out the latter. The proof makes essential use of the amplitude amplification results from Section 2.3.
Theorem 13 (Amplification of Counterfeiters).
Let M = (Bank, Ver) be a projective mini-scheme, and let $ = (s, ρ) be a valid banknote in M. Suppose there exists a counterfeiter C that copies $ with probability ε > 0: that is,
Then for all δ > 0, there is also a modified counterfeiter C (depending only on ε and δ, not $), which makes
queries to C, C −1 , and Ver and which satisfies
Proof. Write $ as a mixture of pure states:
By linearity, clearly it suffices to show that
for all i such that pi > 0. We focus on |ψ := |ψ1 without loss of generality. By assumption, there exists a subspace S such that
for all ρ. Then F ($, S) = F (|ψ , S) = 1. Now, just as Ver is simply a projector onto S, so Ver2 is a projector onto S ⊗2 . Thus
So consider performing a fixed-point Grover search, with C (|ψ ) as the initial state and S ⊗2 as the target subspace. By Lemma 7, this will produce a state ρ such that F ρ,
Grover iterations. Each iteration requires a reflection about C (|ψ ) and a reflection about S ⊗2 , which can be implemented using O (1) queries to C, C −1 and Ver respectively. Therefore the number of queries to C, C iterations. Taking the minimum of the two bounds gives us the claimed bound on query complexity.
Theorem 13 is unlikely to hold for arbitrary (non-projective) mini-schemes, for the simple reason that we can always create a mini-scheme where Ver accepts any state with some small nonzero probability ε. We leave it as an open problem to find the largest class of mini-schemes for which Theorem 13 holds.
The Standard Construction
We are now ready to define the "standard construction" of public-key quantum money schemes from mini-schemes and digital signature schemes, and to prove this construction's security. 
our quantum money scheme S = (KeyGen S , BankS , VerS) is defined as follows:
KeyGen S is simply KeyGen D from the digital signature scheme.
BankS first calls BankM from the mini-scheme to obtain a banknote (s, ρ). It then outputs (s, ρ) together with a digital signature of the serial number s:
VerS accepts an alleged banknote (s, w, σ), if and only if VerM (s, σ) and VerD (k public , s, w) both accept. Now, suppose there exists a counterfeiter CS against S: that is, a polynomial-time quantum algorithm such that
Here $i := (si, wi, ρi) is a valid banknote, Count is the money counter from Definition 9, and p is some polynomial. Also, the probability is over the key pair (kprivate, k public ), the valid banknotes $1, . . . , $q, and the behavior of Count and CS. Suppose further that D is secure. Then it suffices to show that, by using CS, we can construct a counterfeiter CM against the underlying mini-scheme M. Let New (k public , $1, . . . , $q) be an algorithm that does the following:
( Suppose that Count > q, as happens with probability at least
. Also suppose that New = 0, as happens all but a negligible fraction of the time. Then by the pigeonhole principle, there must exist indices j = k such that s j = s k . With probability at least 1/ r 2 , the counterfeiter CM will find such a (j, k) pair. Therefore it succeeds with overall probability Ω (1/ poly (n)).
Theorem 14 reduces the construction of a public-key quantum money scheme to two "smaller" problems: constructing a mini-scheme, and constructing a signature scheme secure against quantum attacks.
In practice, however, the situation is even better, since in this paper, all of our constructions of mini-schemes will also yield signature schemes "free of charge"! The following proposition explains why: Proof. By Theorem 3, relative to a suitable oracle AD (in fact, a random oracle suffices), there exists a signature scheme D, such that any quantum chosen-message attack against D must make superpolynomially many queries to AD.
The oracle AS will simply be a concatenation of AM with AD. Relative to AS, we claim that the mini-scheme M and signature scheme D are both secure-and therefore, by Theorem 14, we can construct a secure public-key quantum money scheme S.
The only worry is that a counterfeiter CM against M might gain some advantage by querying AD; or conversely, a counterfeiter CD against D might gain some advantage by querying AM. However, this worry is illusory, for the simple reason that the oracles AD and AM are generated independently. Thus, if CM can break M by querying AD, then it can also break M by querying a randomly-generated "mock-up" A D of AD; and conversely, if CD can break D by querying AM, then it can also break D by querying a randomly-generated mock-up A M of AM. Regardless of the computational cost of generating these mock-ups, they give us a break against D or M that makes only poly (n) oracle queries, thereby giving the desired contradiction.
INNER-PRODUCT ADVERSARY METHOD
At least in the black-box setting, our goal is to create quantum money (mini-)schemes that we can prove are secureby showing that any counterfeiter would need to make exponentially many queries to some oracle. Proving security results of this kind turns out to require interesting quantum lower bound machinery. In this section, we introduce the inner-product adversary method, a new variant of Ambainis's quantum adversary method [8] that is well-adapted to proving the security of quantum money schemes, and that seems likely to find other applications.
Let us explain the difficulty we need to overcome. In a public-key quantum money scheme, a counterfeiter C has two powerful resources available:
(1) One or more copies of a "legitimate" quantum money state |ψ .
(2) Access to a verification procedure V , which accepts |ψ and rejects every state orthogonal to |ψ .
Indeed, for us, the situation is even better for C (i.e., worse for us!), since C can query not only the verification procedure V itself, but also an underlying classical oracle U that the legitimate buyers and sellers use to implement V . But let us ignore that issue for now.
As a first step, of course, we should understand how to rule out counterfeiting given (1) or (2) separately. If C has a copy of |ψ , but no oracle access to V , then the impossibility of preparing |ψ |ψ essentially amounts to the No-Cloning Theorem. Conversely, if C has oracle access to V , but no copy of |ψ , then given unlimited time, C can prepare as many copies of |ψ as it wants, by using Grover's algorithm to search for a quantum state that V accepts. The problem is "merely" that, if |ψ has n qubits, then Grover's algorithm requires Θ 2 n/2 iterations, and the BBBV hybrid argument [12] shows that Grover's algorithm is optimal.
What we need, then, is a theorem showing that any counterfeiter needs exponentially many queries to V to prepare |ψ |ψ , even if the counterfeiter has a copy of |ψ to start with. Such a theorem would contain both the No-Cloning Theorem and the BBBV hybrid argument as special cases. Aaronson [3] called the desired generalization the ComplexityTheoretic No-Cloning Theorem, and sketched a proof of it using Ambainis's adversary method. Based on that result, Aaronson also argued that there exists a quantum oracle (i.e., a black-box unitary transformation V ) relative to which secure public-key quantum money is possible. However, the details were never published.
In this section, we prove a result-Theorem 18-that is much more general than Aaronson's previous ComplexityTheoretic No-Cloning Theorem [3] . Then, in Section 5, we apply Theorem 18 to prove the security of public-key quantum money relative to a classical oracle. In the full version, we also apply Theorem 18 to prove the "original" Complexity-Theoretic No-Cloning Theorem [3] , which in-volves Haar-random n-qubit states |ψ , rather than superpositions |A over subspaces A ≤ F n 2 .
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Idea of Method
So, what is the inner-product adversary method? In Ambainis's adversary method [8] -like in the BBBV hybrid argument [12] from which it evolved-the basic idea is to upper-bound how much "progress" a quantum algorithm Q can make at distinguishing pairs of oracles, as the result of a single query. Let Ψ U t be Q's state after t queries, assuming that the oracle is U . Then normally, before any queries have been made, we can assume that Ψ can decrease by at most ε as the result of a single query, then it follows that Q must make Ω (1/ε) queries.
But when we try to apply the above framework to quantum money, we run into serious difficulties. Most obviously, it is no longer true that Ψ
for all oracles U, V . Indeed, before Q makes even a single query to its oracle V , it already has a great deal of information about V , in the form of a legitimate money state |ψ that V accepts. The task is "merely" to prepare a second copy of a state that Q already has! Worse yet, once we fix two oracles U and V , we find that Q generally can exploit the "head start" provided by its initial state to decrease the inner product Ψ U t |Ψ V t by a constant amount, by making just a single query to U or V respectively.
Our solution is as follows. We first carefully choose a distribution D over oracle pairs (U, V ). We then analyze how much the expected inner product
can decrease as the result of a single query to U or V . We will find that, even if Q can substantially increase the angle between Ψ U t and Ψ
V t
for some (U, V ) pairs by making a single query, it cannot do so for most pairs.
To illustrate, let |ψ and |ϕ be two possible quantum money states, which satisfy (say) ψ|ϕ = 1/2. Then if a counterfeiting algorithm succeeds perfectly, it must map |ψ to |ψ ⊗2 , and |ϕ to |ϕ ⊗2 . Since
this means that the counterfeiter must decrease the corresponding inner product by at least 1/4. However, we will show that the average inner product can decrease by at most 1/ exp (n) as the result of a single query. From this it will follow that the counterfeiter needs to make 2 Ω(n) queries. Let us mention that today, there are several "sophisticated" versions of the quantum adversary method [9, 27] , which can yield lower bounds for quantum state generation tasks not unlike the ones we consider. However, a drawback of these methods is that they are extremely hard to apply 15 For whatever it is worth, we get a lower bound of Ω 2 n/2 on the number of queries needed to copy a Haar-random state, which is quadratically better than the Ω 2 n/4 that we get for subspace states. to concrete problems: doing so typically requires eigenvalue bounds, and often the use of representation theory. For this reason, even if one of the "sophisticated" adversary methods (or a variant thereof) could be applied to the quantum money problem, our approach might still be preferable.
The Method
We now introduce the inner-product adversary method. Let O be a set of quantum oracles acting on n qubits each. For each U ∈ O, assume there exists a subspace SU ≤ C Suppose that for all U ∈ O and all |η ∈ S ⊥ U , we have E
where 
The following lemma bounds how much pt can decrease as the result of a single query.
Lemma 17 (Bound on Progress Rate)
.
Proof. Let Φ : in other words, the unitary transformations that Q performs in between query steps have no effect on the inner products. So to prove the lemma, it suffices to show the following inequality:
(*) Let {|i } i∈ [B] be an arbitrary orthonormal basis for Q's workspace register. Then we can write
2 .) A query transforms the above state to
By Cauchy-Schwarz, the above implies that
Now fix U ∈ O and i ∈ [B]
. Then again applying CauchySchwarz,
as well, and likewise
by symmetry. Putting everything together,
This proves inequality (*) and hence the lemma. From Lemma 17 we immediately deduce the following.
Theorem 18 (Inner-Product Adversary Method). Suppose that initially Ψ
U 0 |Ψ V 0
≥ c for all (U, V ) ∈ R, whereas by the end we need
oracle queries.
CLASSICAL ORACLE SCHEME
In this section, we construct a mini-scheme, called the Hidden Subspace Mini-Scheme, that requires only a classical oracle. We then use the inner-product adversary method from Section 4 to show that our mini-scheme is secureindeed, that any counterfeiter must make Ω 2 n/4 queries to copy a banknote. By the results of Sections 3.3 and 2.1, our mini-scheme will automatically imply a full-blown public-key quantum money scheme, which requires only a classical oracle and is unconditionally secure.
The Hidden Subspace Mini-Scheme
We identify n-bit strings x ∈ {0, 1} n with elements of the vector space F n 2 in the standard way. Then in our minischeme, each n-qubit money state will have the form
where A is some randomly-chosen subspace of F n 2 (i.e., a set of codewords of a linear code), with dim A = n/2. Let A ⊥ be the orthogonal complement of A, so that dim A ⊥ = n/2 as well. Notice that we can transform |A to A ⊥ and vice versa by simply applying H ⊗n 2 : a Hadamard gate on each of the n qubits, or equivalently a quantum Fourier transform over F n 2 . The basic idea of the mini-scheme is as follows: the bank can easily prepare the quantum money state |A , starting from a classical description A of A (e.g., a list of n/2 generators). The bank distributes the state |A , but keeps the classical description A secret. Along with |A itself, the bank also publishes details of how to verify |A by querying two classical oracles, UA and U A ⊥ . The first oracle, UA, decides membership in A: for all n-qubit basis states |x ,
The second oracle, U A ⊥ , decides membership in A ⊥ in the same way.
Using UA, it is easy to implement a projector PA onto the set of basis states in A. To do so, simply initialize a control
, then apply UA conditioned on the control qubit being in state |1 , then measure the control qubit in the {|+ , |− } basis, and postselect on getting the outcome |− . Likewise, using U A ⊥ , it is easy to implement a projector P A ⊥ onto the set of basis states in A ⊥ . Then VA, the public verification algorithm for the money state |A , will simply consist of PA, then a Fourier transform, then P A ⊥ , and finally a second Fourier transform to return the legitimate money state back to |A :
We show in Lemma 19 that VA = |A A| is just a projector onto |A . This means, in particular, that VA |A = |A , and that VA accepts an arbitrary state |ψ with probability | ψ|A | 2 . Thus, our mini-scheme is projective and has perfect completeness.
But what about security? Intuitively, a counterfeiter could query UA or U A ⊥ to find a generating set for A or A ⊥ -but that would require an exponentially-long Grover search, since |A| = A ⊥ = 2 n/2 2 n . Alternatively, the counterfeiter could measure |A in the standard or Hadamard bases-but that would reveal just one random element of A or A ⊥ . Neither ability seems useful for copying |A , let alone recovering a full classical description of A. 16 16 Obviously, if the counterfeiter had Ω (n) copies of |A , then it could recover a generating set for A, by simply measuring each copy independently in the standard basis. That is why, in our full quantum money scheme, the counterfeiter will not have Ω (n) copies of |A . Instead, each banknote will involve a completely different subspace As ≤ F n 2 (parameterized by its unique serial number s), so that measuring one banknote reveals nothing about the others.
And indeed, using the inner-product adversary method plus some other tools, we will prove the following tight lower bound (Theorem 23): even if given a single copy of |A , as well as oracle access to UA and U A ⊥ , a counterfeiter still needs Ω 2 n/4 queries to prepare a state that has fidelity with |A ⊗2 . This will imply that our mini-scheme has exponentially-small soundness error.
Formal Specification
We are not quite done, since we never explained how the bank provides access to UA and U A ⊥ . Thus, in our "final" mini-scheme M = (BankM, VerM), the bank, verifier, and counterfeiter will all have access to a single classical oracle U , which consists of four components:
A banknote generator G (r), which takes as input a random string r ∈ {0, 1} n , and outputs a set of linearly independent generators Ar = x1, . . . , x n/2 for a subspace Ar ≤ F n 2 , as well as a unique 3n-bit serial number sr ∈ {0, 1} 3n . The function G is chosen uniformly at random, subject to the constraint that the serial numbers are all distinct.
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A serial number checker H (s), which outputs 1 if s = sr is a valid serial number for some Ar , and 0 otherwise.
A primal subspace tester T primal , which takes an input of the form |s |x , applies UA r to |x if s = sr is a valid serial number for some Ar , and does nothing otherwise.
A dual subspace tester T dual , identical to T primal except that it applies U A ⊥ r instead of UA r .
Then M = (BankM, VerM) is defined as follows:
• BankM (0 n ) chooses r ∈ {0, 1} n uniformly at random. It then looks up G (r) = (sr, Ar ), and outputs the banknote |$r = |sr |Ar .
• VerM (/ c) first uses H to check that / c has the form (s, ρ), where s = sr is a valid serial number. If so, then it uses T primal and T dual to apply VA r = H 
Analysis
We now analyze the mini-scheme defined in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. For convenience, we assume for most of the proof that the subspace A ≤ F n 2 is fixed, and that the counterfeiter (who does not know A) only has access to the oracles UA and U A ⊥ . Then, at the end, we will explain how to generalize the conclusions to the "final" mini-scheme M.
It will be convenient to consider the subset
that is spanned by basis states |x such that x ∈ A * . Then we can think of the pair of oracles (UA, U A ⊥ ) as being a single oracle UA * , which satisfies UA * |ψ = − |ψ for all |ψ ∈ SA * , and UA * |η = |η for all |η ∈ S respectively. The following lemma shows that VA "works," and indeed that it gives us a projective mini-scheme. 17 Note that one can implement G using an ordinary random oracle. In that case, the requirement that the serial numbers are distinct will be satisfied with probability 1 − O 2 −n .
Proof. It suffices to show that VA |A = |A and that VA |ψ = 0 for all |ψ orthogonal to |A . First,
Second, if ψ|A = 0 then we can write |ψ = x∈2 n cx |x where x∈A cx = 0. Then
We now show that perfect counterfeiting requires exponentially many queries to UA * . We have
Here the first line uses the definition of fidelity, the second line uses the easy direction of the minimax theorem, the third line uses the symmetry between A and A ⊥ , and the fourth line uses the symmetry among all 2 n − 2 n/2 strings x ∈ {0, 1} n \A. The conclusion is that we can set ε := 2 −n/2 . Fix (UA * , UB * ) ∈ R. Then | A|B | = 1/2. On the other hand, if the counterfeiter succeeds, it must map |A to some state |fA := |A |A |garbage A , and |B to some state |fB := |B |B |garbage B . Therefore | fA|fB | ≤ 1/4. So setting c = 1/2 and d = 1/4, Theorem 18 tells us that the counterfeiter must make
queries to UA * . A simple modification to the proof of Theorem 20 shows that even to counterfeit money almost perfectly, one still needs exponentially many queries to UA * . 
Corollary 21 (Lower
calls to C and VA, and that prepares a state ρ such that
queries from each C invocation and O (1) queries from each VA invocation, the total number of queries that C makes to UA * is
But this contradicts Corollary 21.
So far, we have only made statements about the worst case for a would-be counterfeiter. But such guarantees are clearly not enough: it could be that most money states |A are easy to duplicate, without contradicting any of the results we have seen so far.
We will show that the problem faced by a counterfeiter is random self-reducible: if a counterfeiter could duplicate a uniformly-random money state |A , then it could duplicate any |A . Thus the bank can ensure security by creating uniformly-random money states.
In what follows, let S be the set of all subspaces A ≤ F accepts with probability at least ε, for
Here the probability is taken over the choice of A ∈ S, as well as the behavior of C and V ⊗2
A . Proof. Suppose we had a counterfeiter C that violated the above. Using C as a black box, we will show how to construct a new counterfeiter C that violates Corollary 22.
Given a (deterministically-chosen) money state |A and oracle access to UA * , first choose an invertible linear map f : F n 2 → F n 2 uniformly at random. Then f (A), the image of A under f , is a uniformly-random element of S. Furthermore, the state |A can be transformed into |f (A) straightforwardly, and the oracle U f (A) * can be simulated by composing f with UA * . So by using the counterfeiter C for uniformly-random states, we can produce a state ρ f that V ⊗2 f (A) accepts with probability at least ε. By applying f −1 to both registers of ρ f , we can then obtain a state ρ that V ⊗2 A accepts with probability at least ε, thereby contradicting Corollary 22.
We are now ready to prove security for the "final" minischeme M defined in Section 5.2.
Theorem 24 (Security of Mini-Scheme). The mini-scheme M = (BankM, VerM), which is defined relative to the classical oracle U , has perfect completeness and exponentiallysmall soundness error.
Proof Sketch. That M has perfect completeness follows from its definition and from Lemma 19. That M has exponentially-small soundness error essentially follows from Theorem 23. We only need to show that, given a banknote of the form |$r = |sr |Ar , a polynomial-time counterfeiter C can gain no additional advantage by querying the "full" oracles G, H, T primal , T dual , beyond what it gains from querying UA * r = UA r , U A ⊥ r . This follows from some simple observations: first, let r ∈ {0, 1} n be the random string chosen by the bank, so that G (r) = (sr, Ar ). Then assuming C does not know r, the BBBV hybrid argument [12] tells us that C can gain nothing by querying G: indeed, if we randomly change the value of G (r), it will affect C's output by at most an exponentially small amount. However, once we make that change, an adversary trying to counterfeit |A given UA and U A ⊥ can easily "mock up" a serial number s, as well as the oracles G, H, T primal and T dual , for itself. Just like in Corollary 16, since our security guarantees are query complexity bounds, we do not care about the computational complexity of creating the mock-ups. By using the mock-ups, one can convert any successful attack on M into successful counterfeiting of |A , given oracle access to UA and U A ⊥ only. But the latter contradicts Theorem 23. Further details of the argument are deferred to the full version.
Finally, using Theorem 24 together with Corollary 16, we can obtain a secure public-key quantum money scheme, relative to a classical oracle.
Theorem 25 (Security of Hidden Subspace Money).
By combining the mini-scheme M with a digital signature scheme, it is possible to construct a public-key quantum money scheme S = (KeyGen S , BankS, VerS ), defined relative to some classical oracle U , which has perfect completeness and exponentiallysmall soundness error.
EXPLICIT QUANTUM MONEY SCHEME
We have shown how to construct a provably-secure publickey quantum money scheme, when an appropriate classical oracle is available. In this section, we propose a way to obtain the same functionality without an oracle. The key challenge is this: Note that, aside from the detail that we need security against quantum adversaries, the above challenge is purely "classical"; it and its variants seem interesting even apart from our quantum money application.
We will suggest a candidate protocol to achieve the challenge, based on multivariate polynomial cryptography. Given a collection p1, . . . , pm : F n 2 → F2 of multivariate polynomials over F2, it is generally hard to find a point v ∈ F n 2 on which all of the pi's vanish. On the other hand, it is easy to check whether a particular point v has that property. To "hide" a subspace A, we will provide uniformly-random lowdegree polynomials p1, . . . , pm that vanish on each point of A. This information is sufficient to decide membership in A. On the other hand, there is no known efficient algorithm to find A given the polynomials, and current techniques seem unlikely to yield even a quantum algorithm.
We can also introduce a constant fraction of noise into our scheme without interfering with its completeness. In other words, if only (1 − ) m of the polynomials p1, . . . , pm are chosen to vanish on A, and the remaining m are random, then counting the number of pi's that vanish at a point v still suffices to determine whether v ∈ A. Although we know of no attack even against our noise-free scheme, adding noise in this way might improve security.
Crucially, we will state a "classical" conjecture about the security of multivariate polynomial cryptography, and show that the conjecture implies the security of our explicit money scheme. For the benefit of cryptographers, let us now state an "abstract" version of our conjecture, which implies what we need, and which might hold even if our concrete conjecture about multivariate polynomials fails. Later, Conjecture 32 will specialize Conjecture 26 to the setting of multivariate polynomials.
Useful Facts About Polynomials
By viewing elements of F n 2 as n-tuples (x1, . . . , xn), we can evaluate a polynomial p (x1, . . . , xn) on points of F n 2 . Given a subspace A ≤ F n 2 and a positive integer d, let I d,A be the set of degree-d polynomials (not necessarily homogeneous) that vanish on A. Since we are working over F2, note that x 2 i = xi, so it suffices to consider multilinear polynomials (in which no xi is ever raised to a higher power than 1).
Before presenting our scheme, we need to establish some basic properties of polynomials over F Implementing our scheme will require sampling uniformly from I d,A , which the next lemma shows is possible.
Lemma 28. It is possible to sample a uniformly-random element of
Proof. By Proposition 27, we can instead sample from the space of polynomials which vanish on span x1, . . . , x n/2 , and then apply an appropriate change of basis to obtain a sample from I d,A . So assume without loss of generality that A = span x1, . . . , x n/2 .
We claim that a polynomial p vanishes on A if and only if every monomial of p intersects x n/2+1 , . . . , xn . This In addition to sampling polynomials that vanish on A, we would like to guarantee that a sufficiently large system of such polynomials uniquely determines the space A, so that such a system can be effectively used as a membership oracle. Proof. Deferred to the full version.
Explicit Hidden-Subspace Mini-Scheme
In our explicit mini-scheme, the bank chooses a subspace A randomly and publishes sets of polynomials drawn from R d,A,βn, and R d,A ⊥ ,βn, , along with the quantum money state |A . By Lemma 30, a user can use these polynomials to test membership in A and A ⊥ , and can therefore implement the oracle mini-scheme in Section 5.1.
Formally, the mini-scheme E is defined as follows. Parameters ∈ [0, 1/2), β ≥ 3 (1−2 ) 2 , and d ≥ 4 are fixed. The complexity of the verification procedure will grow like O βn d+1 , but security might also improve for larger and d. Then: 
Analysis
We first observe that the mini-scheme E has perfect completeness. (1 + ) βn, and that v / ∈ A otherwise. The only disadvantage is that we now lose the property of perfect completeness, and can only guarantee a completeness error that is exponentially small.
We now wish to argue about E 's soundness. Naturally, we can only hope to prove soundness assuming some computational hardness conjecture. What is nice, though, is that we can base E 's soundness on a conjecture that talks only about the hardness of a "classical" cryptographic problem (i.e., a problem with classical inputs and outputs). Let us now state that conjecture, which is simply the abstract Conjecture 26 specialized to the setting of multivariate polynomials. Note that it is easy to find one nonzero element of A with success probability 2 −n/2 , by choosing x ∈ F n 2 randomly. Conjecture 32 asserts both that it is impossible to do too much better using R d,A,βn, and R d,A ⊥ ,βn, , and that finding multiple elements of A is significantly harder than finding one element.
The security of mini-scheme E follows easily from Conjecture 32, despite the fact that a would-be counterfeiter has access to a valid quantum banknote, whereas Conjecture 32 involves no such assumption.
Theorem 33 (Security Reduction for Explicit Mini-Scheme).
If Conjecture 32 holds, then E is secure.
Proof. Let CE be a counterfeiter against E. Then we need to show that, using CE , we can find a complete list of generators for A with Ω 2 −n/2 success probability. 
. Provided both of these events occur, we can use s to decide membership in A, and can therefore apply the projective measurement PA. So let us prepare the uniform superposition over all 2 n elements of F n 2 , and then apply PA to it. With probability 2 −n/2 , this produces the state |A .
Once we have s and |A , we can then form the banknote |$ := |s |A , and provide this banknote to the counterfeiter CE . By hypothesis, CE outputs a (possibly-entangled) state ρ on two registers, such that A| ⊗2 ρ |A ⊗2 ≥ Δ for some Δ = Ω (1/ poly (n)). But now, because the mini-scheme E is projective, Theorem 13 applies, and we can amplify ρ to increase its fidelity with |A ⊗2 . After O 1 Δ 2 log n calls to CE , this gives us a state σ such that
More generally, by alternating counterfeiting steps and amplification steps, we can produce as many registers as we like that each have large overlap with |A . In particular, we can produce a state ξ such that
If we now run Ver on each of the registers of ξ, the probability that every invocation accepts is 1 − o (1). Furthermore, supposing that happens, the state we are left with is simply |A ⊗n . Finally, we measure each register of |A ⊗n in the standard basis. This gives us n elements x1, . . . , xn ∈ A, which are independent and uniformly random. So by standard estimates, the probability that x1, . . . , xn do not contain a complete generating set for A is 1/ exp (n).
Overall, the procedure above succeeded with probability 2 −n/2 (1 − o (1)), thereby giving us the desired contradiction with Conjecture 32.
Using the standard construction of quantum money schemes, we can now produce a complete explicit money scheme, whose security follows from Conjecture 32. Proof. We apply the standard construction of Theorem 14 with the mini-scheme E , whose completeness and soundness follow from Theorems 31 and 33 respectively, assuming Conjecture 32.
Justifying Our Hardness Assumption
Though our hardness assumption is new, it is closely related to standard assumptions in multivariate polynomial cryptography. Given a system of multivariate quadratics over F2, finding a common zero is known to be NP-hard; moreover, it is strongly believed that the problem remains hard even for random systems of multivariate polynomials, and cryptosystems based on this hardness assumption are considered promising candidates for post-quantum cryptography [20] . Therefore, if Conjecture 32 fails, it will almost certainly be because some additional structure in this problem facilitates a new attack.
There are several ways in which Conjecture 32 is stronger than the assumption that solving random systems of multivariate polynomials is hard. First, our systems have large, well-structured solution spaces A and A ⊥ . Systems with many solutions are not normally considered in the literature, and while there seem to be no known attacks that exploit this structure, the possibility is not ruled out. Second, we provide two related systems, one with zeroes in A and one with zeroes in A ⊥ . Again, this is a very specific structural property which has not been considered, and there might be unexpected attacks exploiting it. Third, Conjecture 32 asserts that no adversary can succeed with probability 2 −n/2 , which seems significantly easier than succeeding with nonnegligible probability.
On the other hand, Conjecture 32 is weaker than typical assumptions in multivariate polynomial cryptography in at least one respect: a would-be counterfeiter needs to solve a system of polynomial equations with a constant fraction of noise. Solving noisy systems of linear equations over F2 is called the learning parity with noise problem, and is generally believed to be hard even for quantum computers [36] . If true, this suggests that Gaussian elimination is fundamentally hard to adapt to the presence of noise. But computing a Gröbner basis is a strict generalization of Gaussian elimination to higher degree, and involves a nearly identical process of elimination. It therefore seems unlikely that these approaches can be efficiently adapted to the setting with noise. The problem of solving polynomials with noise has been studied recently, and the best-known approaches involve performing an exponential time search to determine which equations are noisy [6] .
But if solving linear systems with noise is already hard, why do we even use higher-degree polynomials in our scheme? The reason is that, alas, the "dual" structure of our money scheme facilitates a simple attack in the case d = 1. ⊥ by counting the number of j's for which qj (ui) = 0, and can likewise decide whether wi ∈ A by counting the number of j's for which pj (wi) = 0.
18 Thus we can learn Θ (n) random elements of A or A ⊥ , and thereby recover a basis for A.
There might be a more sophisticated attack for higher degrees, but this is suggested only weakly by the existence of an attack in the linear case. Indeed, the relation between the complementary linear subspaces A and A ⊥ is precisely the sort of structure that should be preserved by linear maps, but not by higher-degree polynomials! For degree-2 polynomials, it is possible to obtain a similar attack which recovers A from only a single sample. This attack relies on the observation that quadratics have an easilycomputed canonical form [17] , from which a basis for A can be extracted in polynomial time. The essential problem is that quadratic polynomials are very closely related to bilinear forms, and that powerful methods from linear algebra can therefore be applied to them.
Fortunately, the linear structure seems to be computationally obscured when d ≥ 3. This phenomenon is related to the sharp discontinuity in the difficulty of tensor problems 18 If ≥ 1/2, then we can use a variant of Lemma 30 (not stated in this extended abstract), for which it suffices to take β ≥
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(1− ) 2 . We lose perfect completeness, but that is not important here.
with order 3 and higher. More concretely, the coefficients of a degree-d polynomial can be viewed as the entries of an order-d tensor, and the existence of an attack in the degree d = 2 case corresponds to the possibility of efficient operations on order-2 tensors. Basic operations on order-3 tensors are NP-hard [26] , however, and this suggests that analogous attacks might not exist against degree-3 polynomials.
This state of affairs is reflected in existing attacks on a standard cryptographic assumption called polynomial isomorphism with one secret. Here we are given two polynomials p, q which are related by an unknown linear change of coordinates L, and the task is to find such an L. For degree-2 polynomials, this problem can be easily solved in polynomial time [17] , but already for degree-3 polynomials the best known attacks take exponential time [35, 24, 17] . However, if an attacker is given n bits of partial information about the linear transformation, then even in the d = 3 case, it becomes possible to find the linear transformation that relates the polynomials [17] . This does not directly facilitate an attack on our assumption, but it suggests that a similar attack might be possible when d = 3, since an attacker is only required to succeed with 2 −n/2 probability. Fortunately, this attack seems to rely on the particular structure of degree 2 and 3 polynomials. Of course it is possible that similar algorithms may be discovered for higher-degree polynomials, but this would represent an advance in algebraic cryptanalysis.
PRIVATE-KEY QUANTUM MONEY
Recall that a private-key quantum money scheme is one where only the bank itself is able to verify banknotes, using an n-bit key k = kprivate = k public that it keeps a closely-guarded secret. Compensating for this disadvantage, private-key schemes are known with much stronger security guarantees than seem possible for public-key schemes.
In particular, as mentioned in Section 1.1, already forty years ago Wiesner [39] described how to create private-key quantum money that is information-theoretically secure. In Wiesner's scheme, each banknote consists of n unentangled qubits together with a classical serial number s. Wiesner's scheme also requires a giant database of serial numbers maintained by the bank, or in our setting, access to a random oracle R. But in followup work, BBBW [14] pointed out that we can simply replace R by any pseudorandom function family {f k } k , to obtain a private-key quantum money scheme that is computationally secure, unless a polynomial-time counterfeiter can distinguish the f k 's from random functions.
Strangely, we are unaware of any rigorous proof of the security of Wiesner's scheme until recently. However, answering a question by one of us, 19 Molina, Vidick and Watrous [31] have now supplied the key ingredient for a security proof. Specifically they show that, if a counterfeiter tries to copy an n-qubit banknote |$ in Wiesner's scheme, then the output can have squared fidelity at most (3/4) n with |$ ⊗2 . (They also show that this is tight: there exists a non-obvious counterfeiting strategy that succeeds with (3/4) n probability.)
To complete the security proof, one needs to show that, even given q banknotes |$1 , . . . , |$q , a counterfeiter cannot prepare an additional banknote with non-negligible probability (even with a new serial number). In a forthcoming paper [4] , we will show how to adapt the methods of Section 3 to prove that claim. Briefly, one can first define a notion of private-key mini-schemes, in close analogy to public-key mini-schemes. The work of Molina et al. [31] then directly implies the security of what we call the "Wiesner mini-scheme." Next, one can give a general reduction, showing how to construct a full-blown private-key quantum money scheme S starting from (1) any private-key mini -scheme M, and (2) any random or pseudorandom function family R.
Though the details turn out to be more complicated in the private-key case, the proof of correctness for this reduction is conceptually similar to the proof of Theorem 14. Namely, one shows that any counterfeiter would yield either a break of the underlying mini-scheme M, or else a way to distinguish R from a random function. Notice that the analysis is completely unified: if R is a "true" random oracle, then we get information-theoretic security (as in Wiesner's scheme), while if R is pseudorandom, then we get computational security (as in the BBBW scheme).
Unfortunately, as pointed out by Lutomirski [28] and Aaronson [3] , the Wiesner and BBBW schemes both have a serious security hole. Namely, suppose a counterfeiter C can repeatedly submit alleged banknotes to a "naïve and trusting bank" for verification. Given a quantum state σ, such a bank not only tells C whether the verification procedure accepted or rejected, but also, in either case, gives the postmeasurement state σ back to C. Then starting from a single valid banknote |$ , we claim that C can recover a complete classical description of |$ , using O (n log n) queries to the bank. Once it has such a description, C can of course prepare as many copies of |$ as it likes.
The attack is simple: let |$ = |θ 1 · · · |θn (we omit the classical serial number s, since it plays no role here). Then for each i ∈ [n], the counterfeiter tries "swapping out" the i th qubit |θi and replacing it with |b , for each of the four possibilities |b ∈ {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }. It then uses O (log n) queries to the bank, to estimate the probability that the state |θ1 · · · |θi−1 |b |θi+1 · · · |θn passes the verification test. By doing so, C can learn a correct value of |θi with success probability 1 − o (1/n). The crucial point is that none of these queries damage the qubits not being investigated (|θj for j = i), since the bank measures those qubits in the correct bases. Therefore C can reuse the same banknote for each query.
More generally, recall from Section 3.1 that we call a private-key quantum money scheme query-secure, if it remains secure even assuming the counterfeiter C can make adaptive queries to Ver (k, ·). Then we saw that the Wiesner and BBBW schemes are not query-secure. Recently, Farhi et al. [21] proved a much more general "no-go" theoremwhich says intuitively that, if we want query-secure quantum money, then the banknotes must hide information in the "global correlations" between large numbers of qubits.
On the positive side, any public-key quantum money schemefor example, our multivariate polynomial scheme from Section 6-immediately yields a query-secure scheme with the same security guarantee. This is because a counterfeiter who knows the code of Ver can easily simulate oracle access to Ver. But can we do any better than that, and construct a query-secure money scheme whose security is unconditional (as in Wiesner's scheme), or else based on a pseudorandom function (as in the BBBW scheme)?
In the forthcoming paper [4] , we will answer this question in the affirmative, by directly adapting the hidden subspace scheme from Section 5 (i.e., the scheme based on a classical oracle). Since the idea is an extremely simple one, let us sketch it here. Proof Sketch. For each key k and a serial number s, we will think of the random oracle R as encoding a classical description R (k, s) of a subspace A k,s ≤ F n 2 , which is uniformly random subject to dim (A k,s ) = n/2. Let |A k,s be a uniform superposition over A k,s . Then the private-key money scheme S = (KeyGen, Bank, Ver) is defined as follows:
• KeyGen (0 n ) generates an n-bit key k uniformly at random.
• Bank (k) outputs a banknote |$s := |s |A k,s , for a random serial number s ∈ {0, 1} n .
• Ver (k, (s, ρ)) applies a projective measurement that accepts ρ with probability A k,s |ρ|A k,s . Now, suppose it were possible to break S (i.e., to counterfeit |A k,s ), using poly (n) adaptive queries to Ver (k, ·). Then we claim that it would also be possible to break our public-key scheme from Section 5, and thereby contradict the unconditional security proof for the latter! The reason is simply that any query to Ver, of the form Ver (k, (s, ρ)), can easily be simulated using queries to UA k,s and U A ⊥ k,s , the membership oracles for A k,s and A ⊥ k,s respectively that are available to a counterfeiter against the public-key scheme.
Finally, suppose we replace R (k, s) by a pseudorandom function f k (s). Then just like with the original BBBW scheme [14] , we can argue as follows. Since we already showed that S is information-theoretically secure when instantiated with a "true" random function, any break of S in the pseudorandom case would thereby distinguish the function f k from random.
OPEN PROBLEMS
The "obvious" problem is to better understand the security of our explicit scheme based on polynomials. Are there nontrivial attacks, for example using Gröbner-basis algorithms? Can we base the security of our scheme-or a related scheme-on some cryptographic assumption that does not involve exponentially-small success probabilities? What happens as we change the field size or polynomial degree? Does "hiding" a subspace A ≤ F n 2 in the way we 20 Or alternatively, assuming the bank has access to a giant random number table, as in Wiesner's original setup [39] .
suggest, as the set of common zeroes of multivariate polynomials p1, . . . , pm : F n 2 → F2, have other cryptographic applications, for example to program obfuscation [10] ?
Of course, there is also tremendous scope for inventing new schemes, which might be based on different assumptions and have different strengths and weaknesses.
Let us move on to some general questions about public-key quantum money. First, is there an unconditionally-secure public-key quantum money scheme relative to a random oracle R? (Recall that Wiesner's original scheme [39] was unconditionally-secure and used only a random oracle, but was private-key. Meanwhile, our scheme from Section 5 is unconditionally-secure and public-key, but requires a nonrandom oracle.) Second, is there a public-key quantum money scheme where the banknotes consist of single, unentangled qubits, as in Wiesner's scheme? Note that the results of Farhi et al. [21] imply that, if such a scheme exists, then it cannot be projective. Third, is there a general way to amplify soundness error in quantum money schemes?
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(We show how to amplify completeness error in the full version.)
Quantum Copy-Protection and More
Quantum money is just one novel cryptographic use for the No-Cloning Theorem. Given essentially any object of cryptographic interest, one can ask whether quantum mechanics lets us make the object uncloneable. Section 1.4 already discussed one example-uncloneable signatures-but there are many others, such as commitments and proofs.
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Along those lines, Aaronson [3] proposed a task that, if achievable, would arguably be an even more dramatic application of the No-Cloning Theorem than quantum money: namely, quantum software copy-protection.
He gave explicit schemes-which have not yet been broken-for copyprotecting a restricted class of functions, namely the point functions. In these schemes, given a "password" s ∈ {0, 1} n , a software vendor can prepare a quantum state |ψs , which allows its holder to recognize s: in other words, to decide whether x = s given x ∈ {0, 1} n as input. On the other hand, given |ψs , it seems intractable not only to find s for oneself, but even to prepare a second quantum state with which s can be recognized.
Admittedly, recognizing passwords is an extremely restricted functionality. However, relative to a quantum oracle, Aaronson [3] also described a scheme to quantumly copy-protect arbitrary programs, just as well as if the software vendor were able to hand out uncloneable black boxes.
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In the spirit of this paper, we can now ask: is there likewise a way to quantumly copy-protect arbitrary programs relative to a classical oracle? We conjecture that the answer is yes, and in fact we have plausible candidate constructions, which are directly related to the hidden-subspace money scheme of Section 5. However, the security of those constructions seems to hinge on the following conjecture.
Conjecture 37 (Direct Product for Finding Black-Box Subspace Elements). Let A be a uniformly-random subspace of 21 Theorem 13 gives some soundness amplification for projective schemes: namely, from constant to 1/ poly (n). Here we are asking whether one can do anything better. 22 Even within complexity theory, it would be interesting to study the class QMA (Quantum Merlin-Arthur) subject to the constraint that witnesses must be hard to clone-or alternatively, that witnesses must be easy to clone! 23 As usual, full details have not yet appeared yet. queries to find two distinct nonzero elements x, y ∈ A, with success probability Ω 2 −n/2 .
Besides its applications for copy-protection, a proof of Conjecture 37 would be an important piece of formal evidence for Conjecture 32, on which we based the security of our explicit money scheme.
